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THE DOMAIN OF PREFERENCE
LEWIS A. KORNHAUSER t
INTRODUCTION

The concept of preference is one of the central, perhaps the central, concept in microeconomic theory. It is also one of the most protean of concepts within economics where it assumes many forms. Its
centrality derives from its ubiquity; almost every model in microeconomics specifies a preference ordering for each agent. This very
ubiquity, however, explains its protean nature. The models in which
these preferences appear have a multitude of purposes. Moreover, a
given application for a particular purpose may deploy a very different
interpretation or specification of preference than another application
that pursues an identical purpose.
Recently, the concept of preference has come under attack in a
variety of ways. In this Article, I focus on the most sustained and central attack on the concept-that developed by psychologists and behavioral economists. In Parts I and II of this Article, I briefly characterize the concept of preference itself and the behavioral critique of
this concept. I then partially evaluate this critique through two related inquiries.
First, in Part III, I seek a clearer understanding of the multiple
uses of the concept within microeconomic theory. These uses fall into
four categories: descriptive, explanatory, design, and normative. The

t Alfred and Gail Engelberg Professor of Law, New York University. Mark Geistfeld and Liam Murphy commented on earlier drafts. I also benefited from comments
from participants at the University of Pennsylvania Law School Symposium on Preferences and Rational Choice and the University of Chicago Law and Economics Workshop.
For a survey relevant to the economic analysis of
law, see Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAw AND ECONOMICS 13 (Cass
R. Sunstein ed., 2000). This Article largely ignores critiques of the normative uses of
preference in economics. For an early critique, see Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality?
Pat 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 185 (1981).
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behavioral critique of preference theory has different force against
different uses across and within categories.
Second, I suggest two reasons why a critique of a particular use of
preference apparently undermines the concept of preference in all its
uses. In Part IV, I argue that economists have not succeeded in draining their interpretations of the concept of preference of its original
psychological content. The critique of behavioral economics undermines the use of preferences in a psychological explanation of behavior. It does not, however, undermine a role for preference within a
nonpsychological theory of explanation, or in its design and normative uses. Further, in Part V, I argue that the paradigmatic arena of
application of microeconomics-markets for goods and services-is
special, and its characteristics do not translate readily to other arenas
of application. In the standard model, agents choose from some set
of (feasible) options that constitutes a subset of the options over
which the agents have (explanatory) preferences. In addition, the
well-being of agents derives from the extent to which these explanatory preferences are satisfied. The structure of the standard model is
thus special because explanatory, normatively rational, and evaluative
preferences coincide. Some models sever the link between the domain of choice and the domain of explanatory preference or between
the domain of explanatory preference and the domain of well-being.
Once one understands that these domains are not identical, intransitive choices may no longer undermine explanations that rely on a psychological interpretation of the concept of preference.
I. THE FORMAL CONCEPT OF PREFERENCE AND ITS BASIC
INTERPRETATIONS

In the discussion of preference, one must distinguish between the
formal concept and its interpretations. The formal concept consists
of a simple mathematical structure that I discuss below. This mathematical structure, however, may be (and has been) interpreted in
many different ways. In a particular application, an interpretation will
define very concretely the content of the agent's preferences. These
concrete interpretations, however, pass through one of three more
general models-decision making under certainty, decision making
under risk, and decision making under uncertainty-each of which
provides a more abstract interpretation of the formal theory.
The formal concept of preference is quite simple: A preference is
a pair (D, R) where D is a specified domain and R is a linear order
over D. The domain D is simply a set of "objects." The linear order R
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is a binary relation over the elements of D that satisfies three conditions: (i) it is complete; (ii) it is symmetric; and (iii) it is transitive.
Completeness requires that, for every x and y in D, either xRy ("x is at
least as preferred as y") or yRx ("y is at least as preferred as x"). Symmetry requires that xRx for every x. Transitivity requires that if xRy
and yRz, then xRz; in words, if x is at least as preferred as y and y is at
least as preferred as z, then x is at least as preferred as z. "
One may represent many everyday relations, both physical and social, with this formal concept. For example, let the set of objects be
mountains on earth and the relation be "at least as tall as." Then this
pair (D = [mountains on earth], R = "at least as tall as") satisfies the requirements of a preference. Or let the set of objects be individuals in
the United States and the relation be "at least as old as." This pair,
too, satisfies the requirements of a preference. These "preferences,"
of course, have no economic content.
The three distinct contexts of decision making in which economists deploy the formal concept of preference all use the identical
formal concept, even though the terminology used in these contexts-decision making under certainty, decision making under risk,
and decision making under uncertainty-differs in order to reflect the
different interpretation of the formalism required by the context of
application. Under certainty, the decision maker knows with certainty
what outcomes will result from her actions. Preferences in this instance are over the domain of "consequences." Under risk, she knows
the probability distribution over possible outcomes that is associated
with each possible action she may take; economists usually describe
the elements of the domain D of preference as "lotteries." Under uncertainty, she knows only the set of consequences that a given action

One should note, at least in passing, that many central results in microeconomic
theory do not require preference theory. This role of preference in generalequilibrium results is limited in two respects. First, the existence of general equilibria
turns on the excess demand function; it has been shown that one can construct any
excess demand function from the excess demand functions of a finite number of consumers. See Gerard Debreu, Excess Demand Functions, I J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 15
(1974) (demonstrating such a construction). Second, a general equilibrium will exist
even if individuals have acyclic, or even intransitive, preferences. For an example, see
theorem 7.21 and the subsequent example in BRYAN ELLICKSON, COMPETITIVr
EQUILIBRIUM: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 315-21 (1993).
3 One may define from the order R two other relations on D: the relation
I, which
I call "indifference," and the relation P, which I call "strict preference." !is defined by
the requirement xly if and only if xRy and yRx. Indifference is a partial order. The
definition of strict preference states that xPy if and only if xRy and not yRx.

720

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 151: 717

may have; economists usually describe the elements of the domain D
of preference here as "actions."
Even the simple characterization of the domain of preference as
consequences," "lotteries," or "actions" begins the process of interpretation. Formally, the set D in models of decision making under
certainty is simply a set of objects; in the standard market context, the.
objects are "consumption bundles." In decision making under risk,
the domain of preference is formally the unit simplex4 of some (finite) set s. In decision making under uncertainty, the domain D of
preferences is a set of functions from a (finite) set s (generally interpreted as "states of the world") to a set X (generally interpreted, as
"consequences"). In each context, microeconomic theory then generally proceeds to identify a set of conditions that are necessary and
sufficient for the representation of the preference by a "utility" function or by "expected utility."'
II.

THE BEHAVIORAL CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PREFERENCES

Research in behavioral economics has demonstrated a number of
ways in which individual decisions deviate from the dictates of rationality as understood in preference theories. I consider a small set of
these results that bear directly on preference theory. '
First, the initial allocation of property rights affects an individual's
valuation of a good; an individual is willing to pay less to acquire a
good than she is willing to accept to sell it. This endowment effect.ex-

4 The unit simplex in R' consists of all points s=(s,, s , . . . s.)
with s,>O for all i and
2

such that .s=l.
5 For typical

representation

MICROECONOMic TIEORY 8-9 (1995).

theorems,

see

ANDREU

MAS-COLELL

ET AL.,

Other evidence suggests a number of individual deviations
fiom rational decision making as articulated in preference theories. First, individuals in certain circumstances do not conform to the norms of logic. See Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, in THE ADAPTED MIND 163, 167-70 (Jerome H.
Barkow et al. eds., 1992) (discussing altruistic motivations of behavior). Second, individuals do not act in a purely self-interested fashion. See, e.g., Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining
Experiments, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 253, 296-302 Uohn H.
Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) (discussing the ultimatum gaming experiment). Finally, norms of fairness seem to govern some individuals' actions. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr
& Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, 114 Q.J. ECON.
817, 818 (1999) (finding that "in addition to purely self-interested people, there are a
fraction of people who are also motivated by fairness considerations"); Ernst Fehr &
Simon G5chter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Summer 2000, at 159, 159 (suggesting that "many people deviate from purely selfinterested behavior" in certain social contexts).
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ists even when the wealth effect of a particular allocation is small.
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, for example, found an endowment
effect when the market value of a fungible good was roughly three
The endowment effect permits intransitive preferences.
dollars
Consider some good Xfor which the agent has a willingness to accept
of $510 and a willingness to pay of $490. Let bundle A consist of X
and $500, bundle B of $1000, and bundle C of X + $500. Then if the
agent has bundle A, she prefers A to B; if she does not own X but has
$1000, she prefers B to C, but she should be indifferent between A
and C. These pair-wise comparisons yield the judgments A preferred
to B preferred to C which is as preferred as A. A violation of the transitivity requirement undermines each of the three interpretations of
preference theory as decision making under certainty, risk, and uncertainty.
The endowment effect leads to intransitivity and a violation of the
assumptions of preference theory only under some descriptions of the
domain over which the agent has preferences. The violation arises
when we describe options within the domain solely in terms of the
physical characteristics, date, and location of the goods at issue. If we
supplement this physical description of the bundles with the ownership status of the goods, then the intransitivity disappears. The agent
prefers A to B only if she owns; otherwise she prefers B to A. Ownership status is thus decision relevant.
This strategy to rescue preference theory is unsatisfying. Such a
redescription is always available but not every redescription is plausible. In the absence of a reason why a particular factor should influence the agent's valuations, the redescription seems merely ad hoc.
To require a reason to justify treating a particular attribute of a situation as decision relevant suggests that some preferences are irrational.
It thus apparently imposes substantive content on the idea of a preference. Appearances may deceive; the endowment effect poses a problem because agents systematically exhibit this behavior. It thus seems

7 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests
of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1346 (1990) (concluding that endowment effects are
"fundamental characteristics of preferences"). The low price of the good eliminates
the possibility that the allocation of the property right significantly affects an individual's wealth; even an individual whose preferences depended on wealth would have
identical preferences regardless of the allocation of the right. Fungibility eliminates
any possibility that a gap between offer and asking price would arise from nonsubstitutability.
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important to explain either causally or normatively why they exhibit
this behavior."
Second, individuals do not choose under risk in a fashion consonant with the dictates of preference theory." Their probability judgments are defective. For example, individuals generally exhibit hindsight bias; they overestimate the likelihood that what actually
happened would happen. This bias may arise in any legal context that
requires a fact-finder to assess ex post the reasonableness of ex ante
conduct that led to undesirable results. Hindsight bias is, arguably, an
instance of a more general bias that individuals systematically exhibit.
Agents overestimate the probability of "salient" events. So, for example, individuals do not accurately assess information about unlikely
events, such as disasters or crimes, that are prominently reported in
the news media. Thus, individuals may believe very low probability
events to be more likely to occur than they in fact are.
Third, and most important, some research suggests that individuals do not have well-defined preferences at all. The expressed preference depends on the way in which the preference is elicited. Consider, for example, the phenomenon known to economists as
preference reversal, which was first studied in 1971.10 These experiments elicit preferences for options in two different ways. A subject is
asked to choose directly between options H and L and she is asked to
price the two options (by assigning prices p, and PL respectively to the
H and L options). If the individual has well-defined preferences, she
should choose H over L if and only if p, is greater than P, Consider
for example the following two options. First, let H be the lottery: win
$10 with probability 7/9 and win nothing otherwise. Second, let L be
the lottery: win $100 with probability 1/12 and win nothing otherwise. Studies show that individuals generally choose the lottery Hover
the lottery L, but that they generally assign a (lowest selling) price to L

8 Some economists have pursued this
more principled line. For an example of
such an account, see W. Michael Hanemann, Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept:
How Much Can They Differ?, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 635 (1991).
9 See generallyJolls et al., supra note I (advocating a model for the economic analysis of law enhanced by consideration of actual human behavior, as opposed to hypothetical behavior).
10 I rely on Amos Tversky & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Preference Reversals, J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 201, for the history of the study of preference reversals.
They cite Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, Reversals of Preference Between Bids and Choices
in Gambling Decisions, 89J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 46 (1971), as the first experimental study.
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that exceeds the (lowest selling) price they assign to H. This assignment of prices suggests that the individuals generally prefer L to H.
One might explain the phenomenon of preference reversal in
three different ways. First, preference reversal might result because
individual preferences are simply not transitive. Second, because the
choices involved concern lotteries, preference reversals might result
because individual preferences over risky outcomes do not conform to
the independence axiom. Finally, preference reversals might result
because individuals do not have well-defined preferences. Using a
clever experimental design, Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman produced
results suggesting that a substantial part of the phenomenon is best
explained by the third of these causes: individuals do not have welldefined preferences." Other studies show a similar dependence of
preference on the method of elicitation. Generally, individuals respond differently to risky choices that are phrased as providing gains
than to risky choices that are phrased as providing losses.12
More recent empirical work suggests that the phenomenon of
preference reversal presents less of a threat to the psychological explanatory project of preference theory. One study, rather than using
questionnaires, used real payments to the subjects. 3 It found significantly lower rates of preference reversal when subjects received real
payments.14 A second study argued that individuals would perform
better if presented with choices more akin to those presented in real
markets. 15 In this experimental test, the preference reversal rate fell
to eleven percent, significantly lower than that observed in other experiments. 16 A third study showed that the rate of preference reversals
11 Amos Tversky et al., The Causes of PreferenceReversal, 80 AM. ECON. REV.
204, 214-

15 (1990). Tversky and Thaler, supra note 10, provide a clear exposition of the issues.
12 See Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferencesfor Alternative Therapies,
306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1261-62 (1982) (analyzing the results of an experiment in
which subjects were asked to choose between forms of medical therapy), cited in Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framingof Decisions, in ROBIN M.
HOGARTH

&

MELVIN W.

REDER,

RATIONAL CHOICE:

THE

CONTRAST

BETWEEN

ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 67 (1987). One might offer an alternative explanation
of the McNeil study that does not undermine the concept of preference; rather, the
subjects may reveal their inability properly to evaluate probability distributions. The
different phrasings of the two treatments may highlight different portions of the probability distribution.
, Peter Bohm, Time Preference and PreferenceReversal Among Experienced Subjects:
The
Effects of Real Payments, 104 ECON.J. 1370 (1994).
14

Id. at 1377.

Peter Bohm & Hans Lind, Preference Reversal, Real-World Lotteries, and LotteryInterested Subjects, 22J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 327 (1993).
16 Id. at 341.
15
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dropped more dramatically when subjects acted repeatedly in a market setting than when an individual is confronted with an isolated set
of choices. 17 If the agent's expression of preference depends on the
procedure used to elicit that expression, we may conclude that the
agent does not possess a stable preference that guides her choices. If
this phenomenon were widespread, it would render preference theory
unusable as a psychological theory of explanation.
Il1.

THE PURPOSES

OF

PREFERENCE

Economic models serve several different functions. One may
identify at least four distinct categories of functions. Models may
serve: (1) to summarize actual choices; (2) to explain choices; (3) to
facilitate the design of institutions; and (4) to evaluate choices.
Within each of these categories, one might develop models for radically different purposes. Each purpose prompts a different interpretation of the formal concept of preference.
A. Summarizing Choice
This approach takes the individual's choices as primitive. An
agent is presumed to have a choice function C(s) which identifies,
from each possible choice set s, the element (or elements) that the
agent chooses.' 8 The theory then identifies the conditions under
which the choice function C(s) can be represented by a preference relation (D,R).1' On the revealed preference account, the preference
does not explain the choices; it merely summarizes them in a convenient way. Revealed preference theory thus implicitly assumes that the
agent has preferences over the domain from which she chooses. One
might say that the domain of preference is assumed identical to the

17 Marc Knez & Vernon L. Smith, Hypothetical Valuations
and Preference Reversals in
the Context of Asset Trading, in LABOIATORY EXPERIMENTATION IN ECONOMICS 131
(Alvin E. Roth ed., 1987).
18 Technically, one must identify the domain P(D) of the choice function C(-)

where D is a set of elements and P(D) is the power set of D--i.e., the set of all subsets of
D.
] Contraction consistency (condition a) and expansion consistency (condition B)
are necessary and sufficient conditions for the choice function to be a preference.
One may illustrate these conditions in the context of chess players. Informally, contraction consistency requires that, if the world chess champion is a Russian, then the
world chess champion is also the Russian chess champion. Similarly, expansion consistency requires that, if the world champion is a Russian, then all Russian chess champions are world chess champions.
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domain of choice. I pursue the significance of the elision of these two
domains in Part V below.
Revealed preference theory arose in the context of the theory of
the consumer. This theory "naturally" specified the domain of choice
as the set of possible "consumption bundles" understood as the basket
of commodities produced in the economy. Under this interpretation,
it is reasonable to assume that the agents have preferences directly
over the set of consumption bundles from which they choose. Nevertheless, an agent's choice function might not satisfy the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of a preference that represents
that choice function. Thus, revealed preference theory is not tautological.
B. ExplainingChoice
Many economic applications seek to explain, rather than to summarize, the choices of individuals. One might adopt at least two distinct explanatory strategies: a psychological one or a functional one.
The psychological strategy interprets the individual's preference psychologically-that is, as some mental entity or some proposition towards which the agent holds an attitude of some sort. On this account, preference theories explain choices in a causal way: the agent
chooses a given feasible option because she desires it most or believes
that, all things considered, it best promotes her ends.20
Much of the literature critical of preferences as an explanatory
model assumes explanation runs through the psychology of the agent.
Amartya Sen's early and influential critique of microeconomics essentially argues that preference theories are only amenable to impoverished interpretations of individual psychology. 2 Similarly, a psychological interpretation of preference theory underlies Alexander
Rosenberg's critique of microeconomic theory-he argues that the
theory rests on a formalization of folk psychology. 22 Folk psychology,

20 I ignore here philosophical problems concerning the causal
power of reasons
for action.
21 See AMARFYA K. SEN, RationalFools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Eco-

nomic Themy, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977) (discussing the persistence of "egoistic
behavior" as a basis for economic theory), reprinted in CHOICE, WELFARE AND
MEASUREMENT 84, 88-90 (1982).
22 ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, MICROECONOMIc LAWS:

(1976).

A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS
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according to Rosenberg, is fatally flawed as
a basis for empirical sci2
improvement.
for
room
no
offers
ence and
The behavioral-economics challenge to the neoclassical paradigm
of preference maximization presumes that preference theory provides
a psychological explanation for behavior. The empirical research
consists of experiments conducted in the laboratory and hence motivated by nonpsychological factors. The research thus asserts, essentially, that individuals do not choose in accordance with expected utility theory. Another interpretation consistent with the psychological
strategy regards a preference as a summary of the agent's all-thingsconsidered judgments of what she ought to do. For this interpretation to be explanatory, the investigator must assume that agents (generally) do what they ought to do. Under this interpretation, an agent
may have moral motivations as well as self-interested ones. One might
understand this interpretation as a strategy of incorporation because
it subsumes all decision-relevant concerns that agent might have into
her preference ordering. Of course, it may now become difficult to
assure that these concerns constitute a well-defined ordering over the
agent's choices.
The functional strategy avoids interpreting preferences as psychological states. Rather, it explains a choice Yas promoting some end Z
whether or not the agent consciously pursues that end." Functional
explanations, of course, are controversial because they appear to explain a cause by its effect-in this case, the choice Y is explained in
terms of its effect on Z. A more satisfying explanation would identify
some causal mechanism that explained how choice Y came to promote end Z.26 The functional strategy permits the attribution of a
23

Id.

See Lewis A. Kornhauser, No Best Answer?, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1599,
1601-13
(1998) [hereinafter Kornhauser, No Best Answer?] (describing how incommensurability
limits an agent's choices). For a critique of the strategy of incorporation when applied
to evaluative preferences, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, Preference, Well-Being and Morality in
Social Decisions, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Kornhauser, Preference, Well-Being and Morality].
For an endorsement of this strategy of explanation, see Debra Satz &John Ferejohn, Rational Choice and Social Theory, 91 J. PHIL. 71 (1994).
26 For a discussion of functional explanation, see JON ELsTER, THE
CEMENT OF
SOCIETY (1989). See alsoJon Elster, Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: The Case
for Methodological Individualism, in MARXIST THEORY 48, 49-55 (Alex Callinicos ed.,
1989) (comparing the historical role of functional explanation in several disciplines
against its role in the Marxist theory); G.A. Cohen, Reply to ELster on 'Marxism,Functionalism, and Game Theory,' in MARXIST THEORY, supra, at 88, 104 (claiming that "functional explanation lies at the heart of historical materialism" and that "game theory
therefore cannot replace functional explanation within Marxist social analysis").
24
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preference to "agents" that are not conscious. One may thus speak,
for example, of the "selfish gene" that seeks to maximize its "preference" defined in terms of reproductive fitness. This attribution is particularly compelling because, in the biological setting, natural selection provides a mechanism that ensures that the agent's "end," Z, is in
fact pursued by the agent.
In economics, a similar selection mechanism is also often invoked.
Market settings, it is argued, select for profit maximizers. Regardless
of the individual aims of market participants, then, one will observe
behavior explained by the imputed set of preferences. Whatever
one's view of the success of the functional strategy of explanation in
market settings," it is more problematic in most legal and political
applications. Neither legal nor political settings present a competitive
environment that plausibly selects for agents that maximize the appropriate objective function.
C. Design
Much research in economics and economic analysis of law addresses policy concerns rather than explanatory ones. Economic theory in general, and the concept of preference in particular, plays two
distinct roles in policy analysis. First, economists often invoke a preference-based normative criterion against which to assess policy options. I address this role of the concept of preference in the next section. Second, because virtually every criterion for the evaluation of
policy is consequentialist, policy analysis must predict the consequences of the various policy options. Economic theory provides one
such predictive theory.
A good predictive mechanism need not be an explanatory theory.
Reliable prediction requires only that one identify features of the
world that are well-correlated with the outcomes that one wishes to
predict. These correlated factors need not be causally related and
hence may not explain. Much policy prediction in fact does not rely
on explanatory theories. When Congress seeks to predict the revenue
consequences of possible changes to the tax code, it does not attempt
to predict in detail the responses of individuals to the changes in the

27

See Prajit K. Dutta & Roy Radner, Profit Maximization and the Market Selection Hy-

pothesis, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 769, 770 (1999) (providing a model in which profitmaximizing firms go bankrupt in finite terms with mobility, but noting that there exist
other strategies with positive probability of infinite existence).
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tax code.28 Prediction based on proxies may perform better than pre29
dictions based on explanatory theories.
D. Normative Uses
The concept of preference plays a central role in two distinct,
normative projects. First, preference theory often serves as a normative baseline for instrumental rationality. In this normative role, the
content of the agent's preference is irrelevant-the conception of rationality at issue requires only the formal structures of preference to
provide a baseline. Knowledge of an individual's preferences coupled
with the relevant preference-based decision theory permits one to assess what an individual ought to do to best promote her own aims.
This role for preference theory contrasts with the understanding underlying behavioral economics. That theory has no normative aim.
Failure to act as behavioral theory predicts does not subject the agent
to criticism for acting irrationally; rather, it only gives the theorist reason to revise her theory.
The second normative role for the concept of preference in economic theory is evaluative-it depends not only on the structure of
preference but also on the content of the preference of the specific
agent. Consequently, the evaluative role of preference requires an interpretation of the domain D. This role for preference evaluates actions, policies, institutions, or states of the world in terms of the effects
of the action, policy, or institution on the agent's well-being understood as the extent to which the agent's preferences are satisfied.
Consider for example the use of preference to evaluate policies or actions. In such a model, each agent's preference is interpreted as wellbeing. Well-being itself may be understood variously. Some understand well-being as an objective concept that does not correspond (en-

28

For a discussion of the difficulties of predicting tax revenues and the various

nonbehaviorally grounded models used, see George R. Zodrow, Economic Analyses of
Capital Gains Taxation: Realization, Revenues, Efficiency and Equity, 48 TAx L. REv. 419,

430 (1993).

21) For example, short-term forecasts of weather that predict weather at time t simply by looking at the weather at time t-1 may perform much better than predictions
based on explanatory models. Similarly, one might predict earthquakes more reliably
by studying the behavior of animals than by using geological models.
.SOOne might regard either preference theories or behavioral theories as theories
of rational competence. One may then distinguish, as in linguistics, competence from
performance. From this perspective; failure to act as the theory requires indicates that
the agent's performance fails to match her competence. See EDWARD STEIN, WITHOUT
GOOD REASON 37-78 (1996) (discussing the theory of competence in linguistic theory).
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tirely) to any psychological state. The objective account of well-being
may nonetheless satisfy the formal requirements of a preference, but
an objective, evaluative account of preference must then differ fundamentally from an explanatory conception of preference. Such a
difference will persist even if, following other understandings, we provide a psychological account of well-being-that is, one that refers to
the mental states of the agents." These psychological conceptions of
well-being, however, need not correspond to a psychological account
of the explanatory conception of preference. An individual's motivations need not correspond to the set of psychological states that determine the agent's well-being.
IV. PREFERENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
The term "preference" suggests a psychological interpretation of
the formal concept. Indeed, much confusion, both among economic
practitioners and critics, stems from the myriad ways in which psychology infuses some understandings of preference theories but not
others. This Part suggests several reasons why divorcing preference
from psychology has proved difficult. I then argue briefly that the behavioral economics critique of preferences assumes that preference
can be explained psychologically. Finally, I consider the analogy to
biology to illustrate a conception of preference without psychology.
A. The Difficulties of Divorce
A sketch of the intellectual history of preference theories provides
a useful starting point for this discussion. Over the course of the first
half of the twentieth century, economic theorists gradually drained
the concept of preference of content other than a summary of
choices. In early incarnations, the concept of preference had strong
links both to conceptions of well-being within the utilitarian tradition
and to conceptions of the psychology of human action. Classical utilitarianism, in fact, draws on both traditions as its conception of well32
being derives from its conception of human action and motivation.
Classical economists, who both preceded and succeeded Jeremy Ben-

31

For discussions of the conception of well-being, see T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE

OWE TO EACH OTHER 108-88 (2000); L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS AND ETHICS

(1996); Kornhauser, Preference, Well-Being and Morality, supra note 24.
32 See C. Welch, Utilitarianism, in 4 THE NEW
PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 770 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (describing the evolution of utilitarian
theory and its view of humans as primarily pleasure-seeking creatures).
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tham's utilitarian influence, however, often had a more complex conception of human motivation than the one embodied in current conceptions of economic rationality." An important strain of current
economic thinking distilled from these earlier conceptions all reference either to motivation or to well-being. This process of distillation
yielded an understanding of preference as simply a summary of
choice. In 1938, Paul Samuelson formalized the approach in the weak
axiom of revealed preference." Subsequently, other authors have extended revealed preference theory.
Two important features of current preference theories had origins
in the hedonism of classical utilitarianism. Classical utilitarians explained behavior with a theory of psychological hedonism-an individual acted to maximize "utility" with pleasure providing positive utility and pain negative utility. Similarly, the moral theory of classical
utilitarianism required the individual to maximize social utility, understood as the sum of the utility of each person in society. Thus the psychological state of pleasure was central to both the explanatory and
evaluative theories of classical utilitarians.
Subsequent generations of economists have struggled to free both
the explanatory and evaluative projects from their utilitarian origins.
With respect to explanatory preferences, economists attempted to distill away all psychological content. Economists had a less extreme aim
for the evaluative project. There, they merely strove to sever the link
between evaluation and classical utilitarianism.
The work of Vilfredo Pareto signaled a major shift in the founda36
tions of both the explanatory and evaluative projects of economics.
Pareto derived consumer demand theory from an ordinal conception
of utility; that is, Pareto showed that microeconomic theory required

Mary S. Morgan,

The Character of Rational Economic Man, in DIALEKTIK:
MODELLDENKEN IN DEN WISSENSCHAFTEN 77 (B. Falkenburg & S. Hauser eds., 1997).
34 P.A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's
Behaviour, 5 ECONOMICA
(n.s.) 61, 61-71 (1938).
35 For example, Hal R. Varian demonstrates methods
for inferring the ordering
underlying observed data.
The Nonparametic Approach to Demand Analysis, 50
ECONOMETRICA 945, 941-57 (1982). The rhetoric of this article equivocates on the
question of psychology. EdwardJ. Green and Kent Osband extend the method of revealed preference theory to state-dependent preferences. A Revealed Preference Theory
for Expected Utility, 58 REv. ECON. STUD. 677, 692-94 (1991).
For a summary of Pareto's contribution, see G. Busimo, Pareto, Vilfredo, in 3 THE
NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMIcs 799 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987);
A.P. Kirman, Paretoas an Economist, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra, at 804; Josef Steindal, ParetoDistribution, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra, at 809; B. Lockwood, Pareto Efficiency, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra, at 811.
93
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only the structure of a formal preference to explain market behavior.
Pareto also proposed an evaluative criterion that relied only on ordinal utility information. The partial order, "Pareto superior to," and
the maxima of this relation, the "Pareto optimal" points, require only
ordinal comparisons of well-being.
The detachment of the concept of preference from its utilitarian
origins increased dramatically over the next forty years. First, in the
context of welfare economics, the view that interpersonal comparisons
of well-being were not possible became entrenched. s The widespread
acceptance of this view led to efforts to construct evaluative criteria
that avoided such comparisons. The Kaldor-Hicks compensation test
9
Second, as noted above, revealed
constitutes one such attempt.1
preference theory developed further to detach explanatory preferences from psychological roots. As with evaluative preferences, the
aim in part derives from the practical difficulties in determining
someone's preferences.
These efforts to purge psychological content from explanatory
preference theories have failed. The structure of the formal theories
of decision making under certainty, risk, and uncertainty provide the
most direct evidence of this failure. The centerpiece of these theories, perhaps their aim, is a representation theorem. A representation
theorem identifies the set of axioms that an agent's preferences must
satisfy in order for her preferences to be represented by a utility function (with an appropriate structure) .0

37 At least, this conclusion flows from Pareto's argument.
If one requires only ordinal utility information, then the utility function serves only as a convenient representation of an agent's underlying preferences.
38 "Impossibility" has two different interpretations.
One might regard interper-

sonal comparisons as conceptually impossible or meaningless. Altenatively, interpersonal comparisons might be practically impossible. LIONEL CHARLES ROBBINS, AN
ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE (3d ed. 1984), is the
classic text on the impossibility of interpersonal comparisons. One might understand
Arrow's inclusion of the axiom, independence of irrelevant alternatives, as flowing
from this tradition. INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon Elster &John
E. Roemer eds., 1991), is a more recent collection of essays that address the problems
of interpersonal comparability.
39 On the Kaldor-Hicks criteria, see Lewis
A. Kornhauser, Wealth Maximization, in 3
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 679, 679-83 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998).
40 See generally DAVID M. KREPS, NOTES ON THE THEORY OF
CHOICE (1988) (providing an excellent introduction to representation theorems and considering representation of preferences under risk and uncertainty). In chapter 3, Kreps discusses representation of preferences under certainty. Id. at 19-30.
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The representation theorem in the theory of decision making under certainty is the simplest and has the least psychological content. It
states that any preference that satisfies a "closure" condition can be
represented by a continuous utility function. 4' Neither the closure
condition nor the characteristic of continuity has any strong psychological content. The representation theorem is useful, however, for
reasons of mathematical tractability; standard techniques of optimization may be applied to the utility representation of closed preferences.4 2 The representation theorems for decision making under risk
and under uncertainty, however, have significantly more psychological
content. In each of these theories, the major result is a theorem that
identifies the restrictions on preferences necessary to represent the
43
preference by an "expected utility.
An expected utility representation characterizes the agent's preferences in terms of "beliefs" and "desires." Both beliefs and desires
are concepts drawn from (folk) psychology, and their use infuses the
theories with psychological content. The characterization states that
there exists a "utility function" on consequences and a set of beliefs
such that an agent prefers some lottery or action x to another lottery
or action y if and only if the expected utility of x exceeds the expected
utility of y.14 In the theory of decision making under risk, the agent's
beliefs are the objective probabilities that each state of the world will
occur. In the theory of decision making under uncertainty, the
agent's beliefs are subjective probabilities that each state of the world

41 Let the domain of preference be D. The
closure condition requires that, for
everTy y in D, the set of x that are at least as preferred as y and the set of x such that y is
at least as preferred as x are closed. The closure condition is usually called "continuity." See GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE: AN AXIOMATIC ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC
EQUILIBRIUM 55-59 (1959) (discussing "continuous" utility functions).
42 The most mathematically tractable class of preferences
can be represented by a
twice continuous (concave) utility function. A preference must satisfy additional restrictions to belong to this class.
See Gerard Debreu, Smooth Preferences, 40
ECONOMETRICA 603 (1972) (describing the necessary conditions for preference relations of different classes). Not all preferences satisfy either the continuity conditions
nor the additional conditions; moreover, some such preferences are actually tractable.
Lexical preferences are the most common example. DEBREU, supra note 41, at 72 n.2.
43 For decision making under risk, the agent's
preferences over lotteries must not
only be continuous, but must also satisfy a reduction and an independence axiom. For
definitions and discussion of these axioms, see MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 5, at
167-82. For decision making under uncertainty, additional restrictions, such as some
interpretation of the sure thing jninciple, are required. For definitions and discussion,
see id. at 204.
44

Id. at 204.
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will be realized. The agent's utility, in both cases, represents the
agent's preferences over riskless (or certain) consequences.
At least two other factors also explain the difficulty in draining the
concept of preference of its psychological content. First, a psychological interpretation of explanatory preferences emerges in part from
the connections of the explanatory use to the two normative uses of
preference theory. Second, some argue that the requirement of transitivity of choices is sensible only under a psychological interpretation
of preferences. I consider these factors in turn.
Both normative uses of preference theory as criteria of rationality
and as a standard against which to assess institutions and behavior
suggest a psychological interpretation of the formalism. Consider first
the evaluative use of preferences as well-being. In most economic
models, well-being is understood subjectively in terms of the satisfaction of the individual's preferences. This understanding has a psychological cast. In the standard context of markets, it is natural to elide
the agent's preferences understood as well-being to her "motivational," and hence explanatory, preferences. Indeed, the first and
second welfare theorems in general equilibrium theory do so explicitly. 45 The correspondence between competitive equilibria and Pareto
46
optimality links the explanatory and evaluative programs together.
Consideration of preference theory as a criterion of rationality
leads to a similar conclusion. When preference theory serves as a criterion of rationality, the analyst recommends its structure as the appropriate means of reasoning about means to ends. The theory states
that an individual's decision processes ought to conform to the axioms
of the theory. An individual whose preferences do not conform or
who lacks preferences altogether has not decided appropriately. Obviously, an agent who conforms her decisions to the normative demands of preference theory will, in fact, behave in conformity with
that theory. The theory will both explain and justify her behavior.
Amartya Sen has argued that revealed preference theory does not
succeed in eliminating psychology from the concept of preference.
45 On these theorems, see DEBREU, supra note 41, at 94-96.
46

Id.

47 Some philosophers have argued that understanding others requires an imputation of rationality to them. See DONALD DAVIDSON, Actions, Reasons and Causes, in

ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 3 (1980) (defending the "ancient-and commonsense-position that rationalization is a species of causal explanation"); DANIEL C.
DENNETT, True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works, in THE INTENTIONAL
STANCE 13, 15 (1987) (advocating an "intentional strategy" that "consists of treating
the object whose behavior you want to predict as a rational agent").
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He contends that the force of the transitivity condition on choice derives from its connection to psychology. 48 Though it may be that nothing in the concept (or act) of choice requires transitivity, it is not clear
that anything in the concept of preference requires it either. Usually,
transitivity is defended with a "money pump" argument.49 Someone
with intransitive preferences (and no foresight) may be induced into a
series of transactions that make her worse off, as measured by her own
preferences.
B. Preference Without Psychology: The Analogy to Biology
As noted earlier, an explanatory preference theory does not require a psychological interpretation. One might argue that some process of "selection" insures that agents maximize. Evolutionary biology
adopts such a hypothesis to explain the adaptation of species to their
environment. Similar selective explanations have been offered in
economics and economic analysis of law.
Identification of a selection mechanism will usually require the
specification of the content of the individual agent's preferences. In
the standard market context of economics, agents are generally assumed to have self-interested preferences. Consumers care only about
their own consumption, and firms seek to maximize profits. The
claim that the selection pressure created by competition induces
agents to maximize preferences has the most plausibility in this context. It appears, however, that, even in this context, the claim is suspect. The threat of bankruptcy is not sufficient to insure that only
profit-maximizing firms survive. 0
Of course, profit maximization
might be assured through another selection mechanism; perhaps
shareholders who seek to maximize wealth select for managers who
maximize profits.
The environments in which individual agents in economic analysis
of law act generally seem less likely to select for individuals who
maximize preferences. In the late seventies, Paul Rubin and George
Priest suggested that common law rules would be efficient because in48 See Amartya Sen, Behaviour and the Concept ofPreference, 40
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 241,

242-44 (1973) (claiming that all contributions to revealed preference theory must either implicitly or explicitly involve psychological assumptions).
49 For a critical assessment of the money pump argument,
see Paul Anand, The
Philosophy of IntransitivePreferences, 103 ECON. J. 337, 341-42 (1993).
50 See Dutta & Radner, supra note 27, at 770 (positing
that, regardless of threatening consequences, "after a long time, most... surviving firms will not, in fact, be profit
maximizers" (emphasis omitted)).
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efficient rules would be litigated more often than efficient ones.
Subsequent work has challenged this claim on two grounds. First, it is
not clear that inefficient rules will in fact be litigated more often than
efficient ones. 2 Second, even if this differential litigation
hypothesis is
53
true, the selection argument may not in fact apply.
V. THE DOMAIN OF PREFERENCE

A. The Coincidence of Uses
Many models in both economics and economic analysis of law
serve multiple purposes. These models assume implicitly that explanatory and evaluative preferences are identical. In some cases,
they may assume that descriptive preferences also correspond to the
explanatory and evaluative ones. 4 In the standard market setting of
microeconomic theory, for example, the analyst may offer a model for
explanatory, design, and evaluative purposes. Indeed, in this context
the descriptive, explanatory, and normative conceptions of preference
tend, or perhaps appear, to coincide. In the standard model, consumers have preferences over (their own) consumption bundles. In
this context, it is plausible to believe that the agent's preferences both
explain and summarize her choices. Moreover, it is plausible to be-

51 See George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient
Rules, 6J.
LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977) (claiming that enforceable legal rules are more often efficient
due to their unique endurance and response to administrative pressures); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51 (1977) (arguing that efficient rules emerged through an "evolutionary mechanism" controlled by disputants'
utility-maximizing decisions).
See Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can LitigationImprove the Law Without the
Help of Judges?, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 156 (1980) ("We have not found a compelling
reason to think that inefficient laws will be litigated more frequently ... ").
53 Id. at 147-50 (suggesting that differential litigation will
select efficient rules only
under special conditions); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, Notes on the Logic of Legal
Change, in SOCIAL RULES: ORIGIN; CHARACTER; LOGIC; CHANGE 169, 173-77 (David
Braybrooke ed., 1996) (illustrating that the conjecture that differential litigation leads
to the selection of efficient rules remains partially open). Gillian K. Hadfield argues
that efficient rules are not selected even if judges seek efficiency because the set of litigated cases is a biased sample of the set of conducts governed by a rule. Gillian K.
Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583 (1992).
54 When the choice situations are sufficiently simple,
explanatory preferences will
correspond to descriptive preferences because the agent's motivations will directly determine the agent's choices.
55 The model thus places a restriction on the structure of each agent's preference;
it forbids "altruism" or concern about one's relatives and friends.
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lieve that, in the restricted world of the model, satisfaction of the
agent's preferences constitutes her well-being."'
A typical model in economic analysis of law seeks not only to explain behavior but also to propose improvements in the legal institution under study. The same economic model of accident law, for instance, serves both to explain the pattern of decisions that individuals
make concerning the choice of levels of care and activity in risky situations and to evaluate different rules of tort law that govern these accident situations. This neat coincidence of summary, explanation, and
evaluation need not always hold. 7 Such a failure of the three sets of
preferences to coincide presents both complications and an opportunity to explain the anomalies of preference theory that behavioral
economics has documented.
Consideration of the formalism underlying preference identifies
two fundamental ways in which the coincidence of preference may
fail. Consider, for example, the relation between explanatory and
evaluative preferences, with explanatory preferences as the pair (D,,
R,) and evaluative preferences as the pair (D, R,) where W signifies
well-being. Explanatory preferences might differ from evaluative
preferences because the domains differ; i.e., D,,: D,. Alternatively,
though the domains coincide, the relations R, and R, may differ. The
relation between the domain of preference and the domain of choice
raises additional issues. To begin, one might ask what function the
descriptive conception of preference as a summary of choice serves.
Paul Samuelson clearly had an explanatory (as well as design and
evaluative) aim in mind, 5 but the descriptive conception of choice
cannot explain non-tautologically why a particular agent chose as she
did. Rather, the descriptive conception of preference aims to explain
(or reveal) the interdependence among choices; that is, it hopes to
explain not individual choice but market outcomes.

.,, In fact, some models of consumer behavior and product differentiation do not
assume that the agent has preferences directly over consumption bundles or commodities. Rather, these models assume that each agent has preferences over attributes
of products. Preferences over products (if they exist) are thus derivative of these more
primitive preferences. See KELVIN LANCASTER, CONSUMER DEMAND 140 (1971) (explaining that certain characteristics of goods are "relevant" in that they affect "predictions about the choice or ordering of goods by consumers").
57 In fact, in this context the interpretation of preference will also coincide with
the normative project of characterizing rational behavior.
58 PAUL. A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMic ANALYSIS (1983).
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B. Distinguishingthe Domain of Choicefrom the Domain of Preference
Applications of preference theories require a concrete interpretation of the domain D of preference. Earlier I noted that, in the standard context of application, concrete interpretations of preference
have a common feature: they identify the domain of preference with
the domain of choice (and with the domain of evaluation). In standard applications, the set of options from which agents must choosethe domain of choice-is a subset of the set of objects over which the
agent has (explanatory) preferences. This domain of preference in
turn corresponds to the domain of evaluation.
Many choice situations, however, do not have this structure. Often the domain of options over which an agent chooses is not a subset
of the domain of elements over which she has fundamental preferences. Similarly, an explanation of the agent's choice may not correspond to the elements of the situation that contribute to or constitute
the agent's well-being.
Consider, for example, six friends at an Indian restaurant. They
have agreed to share food but recognize that group deliberation over
the contents of the meal will be both long and controversial. Therefore, they agree that each of them will choose one course. In this
situation, a reasonable model would assume that each friend has a
preference over full meals-i.e., over combinations of six dishes. Yet
each friend chooses only one dish, or one element of that meal.
Consider a second example illustrating a different relation that
might hold between the domains of choice and preference. In many
countries, students must choose to specialize their education at a
young age. A student at age twelve, for example, might have to
choose to concentrate her studies on mathematics and science rather
than languages and literature. This choice is difficult for many reasons. The individual-call her Liza-may be unsure about many aspects of the future, including her own talents and the nature of the
labor market she will enter. Even taking this uncertainty into account,
however, the domain of choice still differs from the domain of preference.
One may assume, however implausibly, that, at age twelve, Liza
has preferences over the careers that she might pursue. At twelve,
however, she must choose not a career but rather an educational program. Each educational program leads to a different set of possible
careers. If she has preferences over educational programs, these preferences must derive in some way from her preferences over careers.
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One might think this discrepancy between the domains of choice
and of preference is unimportant because the derivation of preferences over educational programs from preferences over careers is
straightforward. Liza prefers educational program A to educational
program B if and only if she prefers the career C(A) to the career
C(B), where C(A) is the career that Liza most prefers among those
available to one who pursues program A and C(B) is the career that
Liza most prefers among those available to one who pursues program
B. This method of ranking sets of careers has the most plausibility in a
world in which Liza will have equal and certain access to each of the
careers "made available" by an educational program. Liza more likely
faces a world in which her success in an educational program is uncertain and in which not all careers that possibly flow from an educational program will be equally available to her. In this world, Liza
might not evaluate educational programs A and B in terms of the best
(or most desirable) career C(A) and C(B) that the program opens for
her:- 9
The domain of choice D, then may have at least two relations to
the domain of explanation D1,. In the first example, where a group of
individuals chose a meal, each element of D, was one point in a multidimensional space. The object over which the agent had preferences
(meals) had distinct features (each of the six courses of the meal).
Each individual chose a feature of the meal, not the meal itself. The
domain of choice is thus, in some sense, smaller than the domain of
preference, In the second example, Liza had (primitive) preferences
over careers, but in choosing educational programs, she chose not a
career but a set of possible careers. In this instance, then, the domain
of choice consisted of larger objects than those over which she had
primitive preferences.
An important class of models in economics has the structure of
the meal example, in which the domain of choice consists of features
of the object over which the agent has (primitive) preferences. Consider an individual Henry who will live for T periods. He must determine his consumption in each period t. The standard economic
model assumes that Henry has preferences over consumption paths;

50 She might compare program A to program
B in terms of the value of the "expected career" to which each program leads, with each career weighted by her beliefs
about the likelihood she would follow that career and by her beliefs concerning the
extent to which she would find that career fulfilling. It remains the case, however, that
even under this decision criterion, her choice of educational programs differs from the
domain over which she has preferences.

20031

DOMAIN OFPREFERENCE

i.e., he cares about his consumption over his lifetime. DE thus consists
of all possible vectors c = (co, c1, .... c). Henry, however, does not
generally choose his lifetime consumption pattern c at once; rather, in
each period t, Henry chooses c,.
Behavioral economics has studied some members of this class of
models because they pose particular difficulties for preference theorists. Often, for example, behavioral economists point to models of
this type to illustrate a divergence between "rational" behavior and
how individuals actually behave."° The fact that individuals do not
conform to criteria of rationality may undermine preference theory as
an explanatory theory, but it need not undermine it as a normative
61
account of rationality.
A special feature of these consumption models is that, over time,
they conceal some complexities that may arise when the domain of
choice consists of features of elements of the domain of explanation.
In particular, other examples indicate how this structure may provide
additional resources to preference theories to account for the anomalies that behavioral economics has exposed. 62
C. An Example
In this section I employ an example used in my previous work for
63
two purposes.
First, I illustrate how distinguishing the domain of
60 This divergence does not emerge solely from the structure of preferences al-

ready specified. It emerges, rather, from the way in which consumption in one period
is related to consumption in another period. If individuals do not discount the future
in the appropriate way, then they confront a problem of "time inconsistency." The
classic work on time inconsistency is R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic
Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165 (1956). For a recent empirical and theoretical study, see GEORGE AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL (2001). A problem of time
inconsistency arises when the consumption plan that the agent finds optimal at time t
is no longer optimal when she reaches time t+l (or later time).
61 More precisely, the evidence of nonconformity of individual behavior to the
normative requirements of preference theories may undermine only preference theory
as a psychological explanation of behavior; it does not directly undercut nonpsychological explanatory accounts.
62 Some psychologists studying sequential choice have noted that the
studies of
time consistency assume that the agent's preference over the stream of consumption is
separable across time. George F. Loewenstein & Dra~en Prelec, Preferencesfor Sequences
of Outcomes, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 91,91-108 (1993).
63 The example was first presented in JEAN-PIERRE BENOIT
& LEWIS A.
KORNHAUSER, VOTING SIMPLY IN THE ELECTION OF ASSEMBLIES (N.Y.U. C.V. Starr Ctr.
for Applied Econ., Working Paper No. 91-32,June 1991). We later expanded on it in
Jean-Pierre Benoit & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Assembly-Based Preferences, Candidate-Based
Procedures, and the Voting Rights Act, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1503 (1995) (approaching the
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choice from the domain of explanation might explain apparent intransitivities if the domain of explanation is identified with the domain of choice. Second, the example suggests how distinguishing the
domain of choice from the domain of explanation may provide new
explanatory insights and point to novel approaches to the design of
institutions.
Consider an election of an assembly-a committee, a city council,
a state legislature, a national parliament-to govern some body orjurisdiction. Usually election procedures provide that a voter casts a ballot for a candidate (or candidates) and that the assembly is filled candidate by candidate. In the simplest context, to which I will generally
refer, the assembly is elected at large-i.e., each member of the 'electorate casts a vote for each "seat" in the assembly (and the candidates
need not declare for a particular seat)."
Most models of elections consider the usual election procedure.
The models generally assume that each voter has preferences over
candidates. That is, the models assume that each agent's domain of
choice-the set of candidates for whom she may vote-is identical to
the agent's domain of preference. Reflection, however, suggests that
this "natural" assumption is not obviously appropriate if one wishes
either to explain (psychologically at least) or to evaluate these election
procedures.
A voter's well-being does not depend directly on the candidate
who is elected." The voter's well-being will most likely depend directly on the legislative program enacted by the assembly. This suggests that the voter's basic (evaluative) preferences should be over legislative programs or over assemblies as a whole, not candidates.
issue of voting rights from an assembly-preference perspective, and arguing that the
traditional focus on candidate-preference is misleading). I draw here on the later text.
For other work that adopts the same approach to voting, see Jean-Pierre Benoit &
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Social Choice in a Representative Democracy, 88 AM. PoL. SCI. REv.
185 (1994) [hereinafter Benoit & Kornhauser, Social Choice]; Jean-Pierre Benoit &
Lewis A. Kornhauser, On the Separability of Assembly Preferences, 16 SOC. CHOICE &
WELFARE 429 (1999) [hereinafter Benoit & Kornhauser, Separability].
64 A similar analysis applies to districted and numbered;seat elections
in which
candidates run for specified seats and in which, in the case of districts, the electorate
for each district may differ. In addition, the model applies to systems of party-list proportional representation in which a voter casts a ballot for a party. The number of
votes for the party determines the number of seats it receives in the assembly. In this
context, each party is a candidate.
65 If the voter is the candidate, or related to the candidate,
she might derive direct
benefits from the election of the candidate. Alternatively, the election of a particular
candidate would have some intrinsic, expressive, or symbolic value. Neither possibility
accounts for the interests of most voters.
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The above argument extends to explanatory preferences as well.
A self-interested voter is unlikely to care about which candidate is
elected. Rather, she will care about what the assembly does for her.
Again, this entails that basic explanatory preferences should be over
the domain of either assemblies or legislative programs.66
Though I assume throughout that voters cast ballots nonstrategically,6 7 I must clarify the nature of nonstrategic voting. Such clarification requires a distinction between two ways in which the agent may
vote nonstrategically (or sincerely) for a legislative program." She
might cast her ballot as if her vote were decisive. Alternatively, she
might cast her ballot for the legislative program that she most prefers.
When individuals vote for assemblies or legislative programs directly,
these two accounts of sincere voting coincide. When the individual
votes for candidates, however, the two justifications for sincere voting
may differ. I shall say that, when an individual votes for the candidate
that supports the legislative program she most prefers, the individual
votes expressively. The voter's preferences over legislative programs induce an expressive ranking of candidates. When an individual votes for
candidates as if her ballot were decisive, she may not be able to rank
candidates unequivocally. 9 When she can rank them in this way, I

66

Explanatory or evaluative preferences might range over assemblies rather than

legislative programs for at least two different reasons. First, the voter might desire a
representative assembly. She might have this preference because she cares about fair
processes and thinks that a representative assembly is fair. Second, the voter may not
know what issues will confront the assembly. She may face radical uncertainty concerning the legislative program that will be enacted.- The uncertainty is radical because she may not even know the state space, i.e., she may be ignorant of the set of
possible issues that the assembly will confront.
67 This assumption may be defended in a number of ways.
First, most voting
games have many equilibria even if there are only two candidates. In a voting game
over two candidates, there may be many equilibria in which a voter may, in equilibrium, vote for her less preferred candidate. Second, When electorates are large, the
calculation demands on the agent are very large, and it is implausible to believe that
she can solve the strategic problem.
68 In contexts in which the legislative program facing the
assembly is fixed, there is
a natural correspondence between legislative programs and assemblies.
69 Benoit and Kornhauser use an example to show that separable assembly preferences-the condition for the existence of well-defined simple preferences over candidates-are rare. See Benoit & Kornhauser, Social Choice, supra note 63, at 186 (arguing
that many separable assembly rankings are actually "consistent with any single candidate ranking" and are, therefore, not unique). They further show that such preferences do not generally derive from the usual assumptions on preferences over legislative programs. See Benoit & Kornhauser, Separability, supra note 63, at 437 (concluding
that the assumption of separable assembly preferences is not warranted "if assembly
preferences are derived from preferences over legislative outcomes").
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shall say that the individual votes simply and that the derived preferences over candidates yield her simple ranking.
I assume that voters care about legislative programs and that these
preferences induce preferences over the various legislatures. Specifically, suppose that the legislature will act on four issues: employment
discrimination, environmental regulation, economic stimulus, and
civil liberties. Assume further (and without loss of generality) that, on
each substantive issue, the legislature can adopt only one of two possible positions: a liberal one L or a conservative one C. Consequently,
there are sixteen possible legislative programs, each one defined by
the choice of position L or Con each of the four issues. The most liberal program then is (L, L, L, L) and the most conservative (C, C, C, C).
Finally, assume that each voter's preferences are roughly "spatial"i.e., she has a most preferred program p* and she prefers a program p
to a program q if and only if p is "closer" to p* than q is to p*. The
voter breaks ties lexically. °
1. Voters May Have Multiple Derived Preferences
Consider a jurisdiction holding at-large elections for a threeperson assembly. Each voter may cast a ballot for only one candidate.
Each candidate can be identified with the legislative position that she
adopts.7 The following four candidates contest the election:
w: (L, L, L, C)
x: (L, L, C, L)

y: (C,C,L, L)

z: (L, L, C, C)
With these four candidates, only four (of the sixteen possible) assemblies can be elected:
A = (w,x,y) =(L,L,L,L)
B = 1w,y,z/= (L,L,L, C)
C = Ix, y, zJ= (L, L, c, L)
D = {w, x, z} = (L, L, C, C)
70

Suppose Liza is a liberal voter; she most desires a legislative program (L, L, L, L).

She prefers any legislative program that adopts more liberal positions to one which
adopts fewer. For example, she prefers the program (L, L, L, C) to the program (L, L, C,
C). Beyond this, she cares marginally more about the first issue than the second, the
second more than the third, and the third more than the fourth, in such a way that, if
two programs have the same number of liberal positions, she prefers the one whose
first C comes latest. For example, she prefers the program (L, C, C, L) to (C, L, L, C).
71 Assume that each candidate, if elected, will adhere
to her announced position
in her legislative votes.
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Consider a liberal voter Liza. She ranks the assemblies A > B > C >
D, with A as her most preferred assembly. In an assembly-based procedure, a vote for A would be expressive of the liberal's view and sincere in the economist's usual sense. It would be simple in our sense as
well, though trivially, since Liza could not regret the election of the
assembly A.
However, the election is candidate-based, and Liza can cast only
one vote. It may appear that she should vote for candidate zw who
holds the views closest to her own (taking into account the order of
importance of the issues). Indeed, her expressive ranking of the candidates is w > x > z > y. This ranking is not her simple ranking as Liza
would prefer to complete the assembly Ix, z} with candidate y rather
than with candidate w. In fact, her simple ranking of the candidates is
y > w > x > z.72 The candidate ranked lowest expressively is ranked
highest simply. This simple ranking, rather than the expressive ranking, is the "correct" consequentialist ranking because Liza will never
regret a decisive vote that gets y elected, though she might regret a
decisive vote for w. For instance, if she votes for w and hence the assembly 1w, x, z/ is elected, she will regret not having voted for y if that
vote would have resulted in the assembly Ix, y, z} instead.
The reason that Liza simply ranks y first, even though y is expressively furthest from her, is clear. She dislikes y because of y's views on
the first two issues. However, y is "extreme" on these two issues-all
the other candidates disagree with y on these issues and will always
vote y down. On the "swing" issues, y agrees with our voter. With
many issues to be voted upon, a voter could favor a candidate who is
quite far from her ideal position.73
Finally, suppose that the voter could cast votes for three candidates. If she voted expressively, she would cast her ballot for candidates w, x, and z. Should these three candidates prevail, she would
surely regret her vote because the assembly (w, x, z} is the one she least
prefers. Had she voted simply for w, x, and y, she would not regret the
success of any of the candidates for whom she voted, and she would be
delighted if all three prevailed as she most prefers the assembly 1w, x,
y1.

72 Although the simple and expressive rankings differ here, this is not always the
case. Also, in this example, the simple vote also proves to be a dominant strategy. This
coincidence between simplicity and dominance is not a general feature of simplicity.
73 In fact, a "crackpot" candidate could gather significant support
precisely be-

cause many of her proposals will never be enacted; only her views on close issues arc
germane.
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Notice that the expressive and simple rankings correspond to distinct conceptions of rationality. One might thus connect them to
normative as well as explanatory preferences. The simple ranking of
candidates corresponds to a consequentialist conception of rationality
in which the individual votes for the candidate that most promotes
her aims. The expressive ranking, by contrast, corresponds (at least
on some interpretations) to an expressive conception of rationality.4
As the prior paragraph indicates, when the individual votes expressively, she votes contrary to her consequentialist interests.
2. Individuals May Rationally Violate Conditions on
Preferences over Candidates
Two extensions of this example suggest how one might observe
"inconsistent choices"-i.e., choices that arguably violate transitivity,
completeness, asymmetry, or the weak axiom of revealed preferenceeven though the individual acts optimally. In both extensions, I assume that the individual votes consequentially rather than expressively. The first extension keeps the set of candidates fixed but
changes the size of the assembly; the second extension keeps the Size
of the assembly fixed but alters the set of candidates. Each change induces a change in the individual's voting behavior.
a. First extension
Suppose that the jurisdiction has a two-person assembly rather
than a three-person assembly. The assembly functions by majority
rule; in the event of ties, the status quo (C, C, C, C) prevails. As before,
only w, x, y, and z are contesting the election. There are now six possible assemblies with the associated legislative programs:
A'= 1w, xJ =(L, L, C, C)
B'= (w,y! = (C, C, L, C)
C' = 1w,z/ = (L, L, C, C)
D'= (x, y =(C,C, C, L)

E'= Ix, z/ (L, L, C,C)

For a discussion of expressive accounts of rationality, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON,
VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); Elizabeth Anderson, Reasons, Attitudes, and
Values: Replies to Sturgeon and Piper, 106 ETHics 538 (1996). See also Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1503, 1503-31 (2000) (describing expressive theories of action as they apply both
to the individual and collective agents). For a critique of this conception of rationality
as applied to law, see Kornhauser, No Best Answer?, supra note 24, at 1622-37.
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F' = fy, z/ = (C, C, C, C)
Liza ranks these assemblies as follows: A' = C' = E' > B' >D' > F'.
Liza would never regret a decisive vote for w.
If the elected assembly consists of only two people, Liza's simple
ranking of candidates is w > x > z > y. If the individual can vote for
only one candidate, she would choose w from the set 1w, x, y, z}. Recall, however, that, with a three-person assembly, the voter's simple
ranking is y > w > x > z. In a three-person election in which the individual can vote for only one candidate, she would choose y. This pair
of choices is "irrational" on the assumption that the individual has basic preferences over candidates.
Of course, one might argue that the agent acts rationally by arguing that the two choice situations are not equivalent. In one, the
agent votes for a two-person assembly while in the other she votes for a
three-person assembly. Phrased differently, one might say that Liza
has basic preferences not over candidates simpliciter, but candidates
given the slate contending the election. This observation is true, but
it points to the superiority of a model that derives preferences over
candidates from basic preferences over legislative programs, as this
model explains why preferences over candidates have changed rather
than making an ad hoc assumption. Indeed, the attempt to redescribe the domain of preferences as "candidates within a slate" effectively admits that the domain of preferences differs from the domain
of choice.
b. Second extension
In the examples thus far, the voter has well-defined preferences
over candidates. The existence of these well-defined preferences depends on the number (and identity) of candidates. Suppose a fifth
candidate s contests the three seats in the at-large assembly already
contested by candidates w, x, y, and z. Let this candidate s endorse the
legislative program as follows:
s = (L, C, L, L)
These five candidates may constitute ten different three-person assemblies (different in personnel, not necessarily in legislative program) including A, B, C, and D.75 Consider two other assemblies that
The additional six assemblies are:
E= Is, w,x} = (L, L, L, L)
F = Is, w, y =(L, C, L, L)
G= Is,w,z} = (L,L,L, C)
75
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are possible:
E = Is, w,x/ = (L, L, L, L)
F= Is,w, y =(L, C,L,L)
Liza with ideal point (L, L, L, L) can no longer unambiguously
rank candidates. She prefers x to y if s and w are elected (because she
prefers assembly E to assembly F), but she prefers y to x if w and z are
elected (because she prefers assembly B to assembly D).'6 Suppose she
believes that s and w will be elected; then she best promotes her legislative program by voting for x. So out of the set [s, w, x, y, z], she
chooses x. Previously, however, I showed that, from the set 1w, x, y, z],
she would vote for y. This pair of choices violates the weak axiom of
revealed preference because it violates contraction consistency. 7
Nonetheless, Liza's choices conform to preference theory when the
domain of choice is appropriately defined.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

For several reasons, the concept of preference cannot be easily
dislodged from the central role it plays in economic theory. First, the
concept furthers a number of distinct, but interrelated, projects. The
normative uses of the concept of preference as measures of well-being
and as criteria of rational decision making support the use of the concept for explanatory purposes. Substitution of psychological explanations that do not rely on the concept of preference severs the links between these projects. Second, apparent violations of the conditions
that the concept of preference imposes on choice may dissolve once
one recognizes that the domain of choice need not correspond to the
domain of preference. Consequently, one must interpret the experimental findings with care. Preference theory may prove an adequate
psychological theory once we correctly specify the domain of preference.

H= Is, x, y = (L, C, L,L)
1= Is,x,z) = (L,L,L, C)
J = /s, y, zJ = (L, C, L, L)
The assemblies F = H =J yield the only new legislative program.
76 Similarly, she prefers w to y if s and x are elected (because
she prefers E to H,
which has the same legislative program as F) and y to w if x and z are elected (because
she prefers C to D).
7 Supra note
19.

